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By ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON *
In 1935 a former Columbia Law School colleague sent Mr. Justice
Stone a copy of the constitutional law examination he had just given
his Harvard Law students. "Since you know more constitutional law
now than you used to when you were a teacher of equity," Professor
Thomas Reed Powell suggested, "you may be able to answer my
"You are mistaken," Stone replied. "I know less conquestions."
stitutional law now than I did when I taught equity, but that isn't
saying much. What little I did -know is being rapidly overturned by
the Court." 2
After a full decade on the nation's highest court, Stone exhibited
the modesty of an expert. With the benefit of "some years of observation of the judicial process behind the scenes," he even welcomed
"popular comment on judicial decisions." "I have no patience," he
wrote, "with the complaint that criticism of judicial action involves
any lack of respect for the courts. Where the courts deal, as ours do,
with great public questions, the only protection against unwise decision
and even judicial usurpation is careful scrutiny of their action and
fearless comment upon it." '
But in 1915, when he gave the Hewitt lectures on Law and Its
Administration4 at Cooper Union, he distrusted "popular clamor"
against the law, courts and Constitution. "The spirit which .
I In the preparation of this article, the author has had the assistance of Paul
Tillet, Jr., A.B., J.D., Research Assistant, Princeton University.
* A.B. 1920, Litt. D. 1947, Dickinson College; Ph.D. 1928 Princeton University.
Ass't Professor of Political Science, Duke University, 1923-25; Professor of Politics,
Princeton University, 1925-1948. McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton
University. Author, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946).
1. Letter, T. R. Powell to H. F. Stone, May 28, 1935.
2. Letter, H. F. Stone to T. R. Powell, May 31, 1935.
3. Id., Dec. 16, 1935.
4. Published in book form as LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, COLUMBIA UNIvERSITy LECTURES (1915). Hereinafter cited as STONE.
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dictated virulent attacks upon the court" he then described as "a spirit
essentially lawless and subversive of all orderly judicial procedure." '
He, along with other high-ranking members of the American bar, was
then profoundly disturbed with the waning respect for the law, for
lawyers and for judges-and with good reason. Two years before
these lectures were delivered, Justice Holmes had interpreted the
"attacks upon the courts" ominously as "an expression of the unrest
that seems to wonder vaguely whether law and order pay." 6 In this
lecture series addressed to a popular audience Stone tried to allay or
explain "present discontents," rather than probe what lay back of the
popular clamor. "I found the task of making the lectures interesting
to a popular audience," he wrote Nicholas Murray Butler, March 3,
1915, "and at the same time making them scholarly enough to avoid
being 'trashy' a difficult one."
Certain underlying causes of complaint were plain enough. In
the transition from agrarian to urban society, incident to the rise of
industrialism, the independent small business man had fallen before
trusts and monopolies; entrepreneurs had been forced to become workers
for someone else; workers themselves had become mere cogs in an
industrial machine which depended on sharp division of labor for mass
production and upon mass production for its profits. No longer could
all men reasonably expect to become independent in their own shops and
on their own land. Workers were now dependent on big companies for
their jobs, and responsibility for their welfare shifted necessarily from
themselves to their employers, and ultimately to government. By 1915
it was clear that government alone could modulate the typical industrial
cycle-acquisition, growth, concentration-and provide social and economic correctives attending the process. But when society, disrupted by
a-political forces of technology and finance capitalism, attempted to
weave again, through democratic action, the delicate web of community,
the high priests of the law stood stubbornly by their icons.
In politics there had been a signifidant shift from "legal justice
to social justice." Implicit in an ever-growing body of legislation was
the realization that government must keep order not only physically
but socially, that law must protect a man from the things that rob him
of his freedom, whether the oppressing force be physical or of a subtler
kind. Statutes, giving expression to this new social spirit, were widely
contested in the courts, and lawyers and judges, imbued with the relentless spirit of individualism, blithely construed them away, or set
5. Id. at 152.
6. Speech at a dinner of the Harvard Law School Association of New York,

Feb. 15, 1913.

(1920).

Published as Law and the Court in
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'them aside as unconstitutional. The traditional content of individual
liberty and property thus remained unchanged while the substance of
these basic civil rights had undergone revolution.' With cool and
awesome confidence, the court even-handedly accorded unequals a
vacuous equality, oblivious to Thorstein Veblen's dour observation of
1904 that "this conventional principle of unmitigated and inalienable
freedom of contract began to grow obsolete from about the time when
it was fairly installed"; obsolescent, of course, not in point of law, but
in point of fact.'
It was this frustration of social legislation by judicial application
of outmoded legalistic concepts that stirred angry and vociferous protest, evoking during the first decade of the 20th century popular slogans
demanding recall of judges and of judicial decisions, proposing radical
amendments of the Constitution, and even suggesting its abolition.
This hostility disturbed Stone profoundly. In his own state, criticism
of the Court of Appeals had been "so loud, so ill-tempered, and so
misguided, as to startle those who have respect for and faith in our
institutions." '0 "Perhaps in no period," Dean Stone noted, "and
certainly not in the present generation, have law and lawyers been so
much the subject of popular discussion and criticism as at the present
day." "
What troubled him especially was that vague, indefinable "political
aspiration" called "social justice." "The prevailing social unrest," he
explained, "the impatient desire for speedy, not to say hasty, recognition
of scarcely yet formulated theories of social welfare, have found expression in criticism of our whole system of law administration. This
public discussion of law and lawyers has resulted in the coining of a
new phrase"-"social justice." 1 Dean Stone was not sure just what
was "intended to be expressed by the phrase." When used as a
"political theory of social welfare" or "as a political war cry," he disclaimed any interest in this "fantastic" social fad.'" He was very
7. "Political as well as economic and social science noted these revolutionary
changes," L. D. Brandeis observed in 1916. "But legal science-the unwritten or
judge-made laws as distinguished from legislation-was largely deaf and blind to
them. Courts continued to ignore newly arisen social needs. They applied complacently 18th century conceptions of the liberty of the individual and of the sacredness of private property. Early 19th century scientific half-truths like 'The survival
of the fittest,' which translated into practice meant 'The devil take the hindmost,'
were erected by judicial sanction into a moral law." Brandeis, The Living Law,
10 IL. L. REv. 461, 463 (1916).
8. VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPiSuE 274, 275 (1904).
9. Brandeis, .rupra note 7, at 464.
10. SToNE at 152.
11. Id. at 40.
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 41.
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much concerned when, as was often the case, social justice was coupled
with "the notion that judges, in the administration of common law
rules, and especially in formulating new rules of law, should consciously
endeavor to mold the rules of law to conform to their own personal
notions of what is the correct theory of social organization and development, even though the result should be in many cases to disregard
or overturn established rules of law." "4 One reason why he agreed
to give the Hewitt lectures was the conviction that ill-feeling might be
ameliorated if "certain fundamental notions" about law and its administration could be made "part of the intellectual equipment of every
intelligent citizen." 1
The lecturer was drawn inexorably into the discussions then rife,
growing out of the "celebrated" Ives decision of 1911. In this case,
a court manned by judges whom Stone described as of "unquestioned
integrity and of great learning and ability" 16 invalidated the recently
enacted Workingmen's Compensation law. "To impose upon an employer, who has . . .committed no wrong, a liability based solely on a
legislative fiat," the Court ruled with mathematical precision, "is taking
the property of A and giving it to B, and that cannot be done under
our Constitutions." " Whatever the wisdom or unwisdom of workmen's compensation, it marked a radical departure from the common
law. "The theory," underlying the legislation, the court said emphatically, "is not merely new in our system of jurisprudence, but
plainly antagonistic to its basic idea." 18 At common law the burden
of on-the-job injuries fell on the workers themselves, on their families,
or on local charities. The New York statute had sought to substitute
for the atomistic concept of liability, based on individual fault, the
principle that economic enterprise should bear the full cost of its normal
operation.
Stone's sympathy for the plight of the injured workman is implicit in his recognition that in modern industry there is, under the
most careful management, "a pretty definite amount of injury to workmen." He was certain that such economic loss "should not fall upon
the employee in the trade, but should be added to the cost of production." ' "Tremendous industrial changes" had rendered obsolete the
common law defenses of the employer. "It cannot fairly be said," he
declared, "that the industrial employee is free not to assume the risk
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Ibid.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 150.
Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 296 (1911).
Ibid.
19. STONE at 71.
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of his employment or that he stands on a plane of equality with the
employer in entering into the contract of employment." "Changes of
condition so extensive," he went on, "could only be adequately and
promptly met by comprehensive legal changes necessarily worked out
by legislation." 20

The New York State legislature had, in fact, been motivated by
these stem social realities in passing the Workmen's Compensation
Act of 1910. Yet the Dean expressed sympathy, even respect, for the
political and constitutional theory underlying the Ives decision, quoting
at length and with approval, the court's reasoning:
The right of property rests not upon philosophical or scientific
speculations nor upon the commendable impulses of benevolence
or charity, nor yet upon the dictates of natural justice. The right
has its foundation in the fundamental law. That can be changed
by the people, not by legislatures. In a government like ours
theories of public good or necessity are often so plausible or sound
as to command popular approval, but courts are not permitted to
forget that the law is the only chart by which the ship of state is
to be guided. Law as used in this sense means the basic law and
not the very act of legislation which deprives the citizen of his
rights, privileges or property. Any other view would lead to the
absurdity that the Constitutions protect only those rights which
the legislatures do not take away. If such economic and sociologic
arguments as are here advanced in support of this statute can be
allowed to subvert the fundamental idea of property, then there
is no private right entirely safe, because there is no limitation
upon the absolute discretion of legislatures, and the guarantees of
the Constitution are a mere waste of words. 2
"This language," the lecturer told his Cooper Union audience,
"may well commend itself to the thoughtful, and lead to the conclusion
that the proper method of securing the economic benefits of workmen's
compensation, if such legislation is to go beyond the limits above indicated, is 'by the orderly process of constitutional amendment rather
than by making a universal test of the right to take private property
for the supposed economic advantage to result therefrom.' "22 Stone's
endorsement is even more specific. He agreed that the workmen's
compensation statute did "deprive the employer of property without
any common-law liability on his part, and the mere fact that the
deprivation .

.

. was economically desirable, did not constitute the

taking due process of law." 23
20. Ibid.

21. 201 N.Y. 271, 294 (1911).
22. Id. at 152.
23. Id. at 151.

Quoted in

STONE

at 151.
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The speaker did not pause to tell his audience that the ruling was
largely ignored in other jurisdictions. He did not call attention to a
decision of the United States Supreme Court upholding federal workmen's compensation for employees of interstate carriers. 24 Nor did he
point out that five state courts-Kansas, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin,
and Massachusetts-approved workmen's compensation legislation
within a year after the Court of Appeals nullified the New York
statute.2 5 However, the lecturer did call attention to the fact that,
among 749 opinions handed down by the New York Court of Appeals
in 1911, only the Ives decision had stirred the febrile pens of ardent
social reformers. 26 "Certainly . . . the volleys of criticism which have
been directed toward the Ives case .

.

.

[were]," Stone concluded,

"entirely disproportionate to any practical inconvenience which flowed

from that decision."

27

But whose "practical inconvenience" was involved? In what
terms could it be measured? There were some 60,554 victims of
industrial accidents in 1911,28 many of whom received no compensation largely because the employer was able, thanks to the Court's
ruling in the Ives case, to invoke common-law defenses which Stone
himself considered anachronistic. The embattled decision was promptly
corrected by Constitutional amendment in 1913 2 9 -to Stone the only
legitimate remedy open-and he took no little satisfaction in noting
that the amendment was drafted, initially at least, by persons connected
30
with Columbia Law School.
What precisely is Stone's position on the Ives case? Was he
seeking to support, minimize or explain it? One who reads these lectures in book form may not find clear answers to these questions.
Stone had stated his position more incisively in 1912 when Edward
T. Devine bitterly attacked the Tenement House decision of the New
York Court of Appeals, ruling that an "apartment house" is not
a "tenement" and therefore the strict provisions of the Tenement House
Act of 1901 were not applicable to the plaintiff's "high grade" apart24. Second Employers' Liability Act Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
25. 27 THE SURVEY 1906 (1912).
26. STONE at 188.
27. Id. at 190.
28. Report of the Commissioner of Labor, New York State, for the year ending
Sept. 30, 1911, 1 ANNUAL REPORTS OF DEPARTMENT BUREAUS 150.
29. Amendment to Art. 1 of New York Constitution, adopted at general election,
Nov. 4, 1913. 4 L. ws OF NEw YORK, EXTRAORDINARY SESSION 2492 (1913).
30. ANNUAL REPORTS OF COLUMBIA UNivERsrry, 1911-12 at 70. In his report
to the President of Columbia University for 1911-12, Dean Stone mentioned the
receipt of a gift to promote scientific study of legislative drafting and reported use
of the fund to prepare several pieces of legislation, among them, the amendment under
discussion and a workmen's compensation statute adopted by the Federal Congress.
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ment.3
"Another bad decision" was the caption Devine, professor
of sociology at Columbia University and editor of The Survey, gave
his scorching editorial.3 2 "Under the present decision," the editor commented scornfully, "a tenement house is not a tenement house if it has
a bath-tub--unless it happens to be in Buffalo." 3' After a merciless,
non-legalistic analysis of the Court's legalistic reasoning, Devine concluded: "We hold it to be essential, as a condition of retaining popular
respect for courts in general, that such decisions as this one . . . [and]
the decision of a year ago destroying the workingmen's compensation
act 3 4 . . . should be held up to the reprobation and scorn which they
deserve. .
. We . . . cannot well be silent when justice is subverted

and when social advance is stupidly and unnecessarily blocked..
The fundamental remedy lies not in amendment .

.

. but . . . in a

process of education through which it will eventually be brought home
to judges and their successors that such blundering with human lives
. . . is not good law any more than it is good economics, philosophy

and morals." '5
"The radical way out of the deplorable situation created by such
rare and unaccountable decisions as these," the editor suggested, "lies
in the education of the judges." 8
To Stone, Devine's editorial was "typical of much of the criticism
of our courts appearing in current newspapers and magazines." 37 The
tone of the comment, the Dean wrote the Survey editor, "surprises
and shocks me, and not any the less so because I am inclined to the
opinion, after a brief examination of the statutes involved, that the correctness of the decision of the court is open to some doubt." 38
For Dean Stone the question involved in the Tenement House
decision was "purely one of statutory construction." " Comment by
"the trained lawyer" on the method by which the Court ascertained
its principles was, he agreed, not only "'permissible" but "desirable,
since it tends to the proper development of the law and an accurate
understanding of those principles which should govern judicial decisions." " But Devine's "startling" suggestion that the Court would
31. Grimmer v. The Tenement House Department of the City of New York, 204

N.Y. 370 (1912).
32. 27

THE

SRmvzr 1891 (1912).

33. Id. at 1893.
34. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271 (1911).

35. 27 The Survey 1895, 1896, passim.
36. Id. at 1895.
37. Stone, "The Tenement House Decision," Letter to the

SuPmvzy 1893 (1912).

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.

Editor, 27 THE
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have rendered a different decision in the Workmen's Compensation
Act case if it had "foreseen just what a reception the opinion was to
have," could "only be founded either upon the theory that justice
reposes in the bosoms of those who can shout the loudest, or that the
judges of the Court of Appeals would violate their oaths of office for
the sake of satisfying popular clamor." "'
"The view that it is possible to base judicial decisions upon some
vague notion of social justice," Dean Stone reminded the editor,
"finds frequent expression in these days of hasty and ill-considered
criticism. Social justice may mean anything, and therefore, as a basis
of judicial decision, means nothing, . .

.

it is usually used as a term

descriptive of the particular remedy which the critic of courts desires
very much, but is unable to obtain from the courts by the application
of his particular theories of judicial legislation. Abstract justice, or
social justice, cannot exist under a system administered by mere man,
apart from that approximate justice which is administered by our
courts, according to a system of rules and principles. Not abstract
justice, not social justice, therefore, should be our quest, but justice
according to law; and, in order that justice according to law may
approximate abstract justice, let us direct our criticism of the courts
toward the rules and principles of decisions, not toward the intelligence
or motives of the judges, and let us value the correctness of their decisions by the skill and accuracy with which they apply those rules and
principles."

42

In 1915, as in 1912, Stone viewed censure of the courts as a serious
business, a function properly confined to lawyers, law school teachers
and students. He impugned the layman's competence in this area and
set up standards of criticism hard, if not impossible, for him to meet.
"The School of Law, in which I have the honor to be a teacher,"
he wrote the Survey editor, "is much engaged in the criticism of
judicial opinions. Neither teachers nor students consider that in so
doing they are guilty of any disrespect to the courts, or that they act
in contempt of the institution which is vital to the perpetuation of a
41. Id. at 1984.
42. Id. at 1983, 1984. A former colleague and friend explains Stone's reactions
to popular criticism of the Ives and Tenement House decisions in terms of personalities. "He was considerably affected," Powell remarked, "by the personal and
intellectual quality of the man who advanced various views. He had no respect
for Devine, a professor of Sociology at Columbia, and Devine's criticism of the
Ives case influenced Stone to support or apologize for it and minimize it in his
Carpentier (Hewitt) Lectures.
However, when Goodnow and Chamberlain
(Columbia Law School Professors) criticized the Ives decision, Stone with his
respect for them was ready to consider their views calmly and to give weight to the
fact that they held them." Letter, Powell to Alfred McCormack, quoted in Letter,
McCormack to A.T.M., Nov. 15, 1950.
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free government. In the discussion of judicial opinions, however, the
following canons are carefully observed:
1. That all criticisms should be intelligently directed toward
the rules and principles which must necessarily govern judicial
decisions.
2. That such criticism should be fair and made with respect
for the courts, as the best instrumentality for the administration
of justice which humankind has as yet devised.
3. That abstract or social justice as a test for the correctness
of judicial decisions is absolutely without value.
4. That the fact that one or many members of the community who very much desire the establishment of a legal principle are actuated by good motives does not establish that the
principle is sound, or will, in the generality of cases, promote
justice.
"Do you not think, Mr. Editor," Stone asked, "that The Survey
might properly and wisely adopt these canons of criticism ?" 11
Stone's vehement protest against Devine's assumption that laymen
can properly criticize or "educate" judges, when they err in interpreting
the language of constitutions and statutes, reflects basic theories of
law, of courts and constitutions. "Law," Stone defined in his opening
lecture, as "the sum total of all those rules of conduct for which there
is state sanction." 4" It is "pre-eminently a practical system administered by human agencies." " In its making, experience and specialized
knowledge are more important than theory. "Whatever the desirability
of a certain result, . . . whatever its theoretical excellence," he empha-

sized, "there are practical limits to the extent to which the regulation
of human action may be successfully and efficiently carried." 46 Involved in the new-fangled sociological approach was a "theory of legislation," "an attempt to formulate law on the basis of the legislator's
view of what is sound public policy." " Even those whose business is
to legislate, Stone reminded his audience, "are not always accurate
observers or infallible prophets." 4 The judge, by contrast, is controlled "by stubborn facts proven in court, and he is sobered by the
ever-present realization that by his judgment he is determining the
rights of individuals" immediately before him.4 9 For this reason Stone
43. 27 THE SuRVEY 1983, 1984 (1912).

44.
45.
46.
47.

STONE at 3.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8, 9.
Id. at 42.

48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 38.
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gave short shrift to "sociological jurisprudence"-the notion that
" 'legal science ought to be founded upon generalizations from a descriptive sociology.' " 50 "As a principle of judicial decision," the lecturer concluded, "certainly nothing could be more destructive of [the]
essential qualities" of the common law.5
For Stone legal change was a process by which governing rules
come to "slow maturity." The legislator and the judge play their
respective roles. The legislator is concerned with what is "good public
policy" and must necessarily "seek to ascertain the opinion of the com52
munity" of which he is a representative and to which he is responsible.
But not even the legislator has carte blanche. Besides constitutional
restriction, he must be wary, lest he jeopardize respect for law, in giving
legal sanction to a moral precept which long experience has not yet
crystallized into a "settled principle of social conduct." " The judge's
function is even more circumscribed: "to ascertain whether the facts
proved in the case . . . are controlled by rules of law which may be

found in the precedents." " If legal rules can be found to fit the facts at
bar the judge is bound to apply them "regardless of his personal notions
of what may be 'social justice.' "5
Stone admitted that in "the rare instances where precedents afford
no controlling principle, the judge will naturally consider the opinion
of experts as embodied in the writings of those learned in the law." 16
He will also be guided by considerations of "settled custom or usage
of the community," and "if necessary to the settlement of the question"
by "his own notion of what is sound public policy." '7 But in this
severely restricted area of judicial law-making, the court must not
think of itself as "an interpreter of public sentiment." " The success
with which he discharges his function will depend on how completely
he insulates himself from the pressures of the community of which he
is a part.
The Judge "need not, and indeed ought not, listen," Dean Stone
declared, "with his ear to the ground to ascertain from popular clamor
the latest expression of the 'newest thing' in social welfare. His function is not political or legislative to enact the popular will or what he
50. Id. at 42.
51. Id. at 52.
52. Id. at 43.
53. Id. at 34.
54. Id. at 43, 44.
55. Id. at 44.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
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may mistakenly believe to be the popular will. His function is judicial,
to act as the judge in ascertaining and applying established principles
of law when they offer a guide and in accordance with his conception
of right and wrong when there is no other guide." " Justice, as Dean
Stone defined it, meant "justice according to law as formulated and
declared by the courts." "'
From this it followed that fault-finding based on the refusal of
courts to be guided by principles of "social justice" or on "the supposed excessive recognition" of the "rights of property" is "thoughtless," 61 even "subversive." ' The very notion of individual property
is "the great distinction" between civilization and lawless savagery. 3
"Impair the 'rights of property' . . . and you strike at one of the great

foundations on which civilized society rests." " Basic to any system
of justice according to law is public faith. "No amount of law reform
will ever give legal justice to a people who themselves are indifferent
to it or who are controlled by passion or prejudice, or class selfishness." 65
Stone's admonition to "impatient reformers" was akin to that
expressed in 1912 by his future colleague on the United States Supreme
Court, George Sutherland: "to follow the constitutional stairway step
by step may be a slow and tiresome process, but it at least assures us
of a safe arrival." 66 "The history of the subject in New York," Stone
declared optimistically, "emphasizes the fact that there is a direct and
orderly method of correcting the erroneous determinations of courts,
if such are made, and of bringing the provisions of our Constitution
into harmony with the popular will without resorting to ill-tempered
abuse of the courts." 17 Stone was likewise in accord with the former
Utah Senator on the Constitution."'
59. Ibid.
60. Id. at 33.

61. Id. at 60.
62. Id. at 152.
63. Id. at 61.
64. Ibid.
65. Id. at 193.
66. The Courts and the Constitution, 37 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 371, 376 (1912),
an address delivered at the 85th annual meeting of the American Bar Ass'n, Milwaukee, Wis., Aug. 28, 1912.

67. SToNE at 155.
68. "If constitutional and orderly government is to endure," Sutherland has said,
throwing down the gauntlet to "social justice," "there is but one course for the
courts to follow, and that is to set their faces steadily and unswervingly against any
palpable violation of that great instrument, no matter how overwhelming in the
particular instance may be the popular sentiment, or how strong the necessity may
seem, for if the door be opened to such violation or evasion on the ground of necessity we shall be unable to close it against expediency or mere convenience." The
Courts and the Constitution, supra note 67, at 391.
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Our Fundamental Law, the Dean told his Cooper Union audience,
is a "body of legal rules or precepts which regulate or control governmental action." 69

"The sole object and purpose .

.

. should be to

give stability to government and to protect individuals from oppression, both by the established agencies of government and by temporary
majorities which may control some branch of the government." 7o
Stone, like Sutherland, seemed to think of a constitution more as a
barrier than as a gateway, more as a charter of rights than as a grant
of power, more as a "lawyer's document" than as "a vehicle of the
nation's life." 71 It is, Stone declared, "nothing more or less than a
check on the arbitrary and oppressive exercise of governmental power,
which cannot be hastily set aside or overturned, and which cannot be
affected by the clamor or the action of mere temporary majorities." 72
Stone accepted without question the historical and judicial foundations of the Supreme Court's broad-gauged censorial power over legislation. "The power to restrict and control governmental action must
be," he reasoned, "lodged somewhere," 73 and it is best that this authority be lodged with the courts. "Is there after all," he asked
rhetorically at the end of his lecture on constitutional limitations, "any
body in our governmental scheme which is, judged in the light of our
experience, by the method of its selection and its freedom from untoward influences, better qualified to exercise this power or to whom
it may be more safely intrusted than the judiciary?" 74 "Judges are
trained," the lecturer continued, in the common law and are moved
to decision not by "whim or caprice" or "enthusiasms about social
conditions" but "by stubborn facts proven in court." 7 They are
bound to follow settled principles of law so far as they afford a guide.
Judicial decisions are "therefore justly and properly . . .a conservative

force in the community. They protect the rights of those whose rights
may be overlooked or temporarily obscured by public clamor or in
69. STONE at 128.
70. Id. at 129.
71. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (1907).
72. STONE at 130.
73. Id. at 158.
74. Ibid. Justice David J.Brewer had expressed a similar view in 1893: "But
the great body of judges are as well versed in affairs as any, and they who unravel
all the mysteries of accounting between partners, settle the business of the largest
corporations and extract all the truth from the mass of sciolistic verbiage that falls
from the lips of expert witnesses in patent cases, will have no difficulty in determining what is right and wrong between employer and employees, and whether
proposed rates of freight and fare are reasonable as between the public and the
owners; while as for speed, is there anything quicker than a writ of injunction?"
The Movenwnt of Coercion, 16 PROCEEDINGS OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 37, 43
(1893). Stone also gave qualified approval to Brewer's views on the labor injunction. See STONE at 102, 104.
75. STONE at 16, 38.
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times of political excitement. They are the bulwark of the minority
against the tyranny of temporary majorities." 71
For those who complained that courts in interpreting the Constitution too often neglect considerations of "social justice," Stone had
a ready answer. Their idea, he explained, "is . . . that in passing
upon the constitutionality of so-called social legislation, the courts
should accept as conclusive the opinion of the legislature as to the
economic desirability of the statute." 7 , "This requirement," Stone
reiterated, "can be met only by a change in the structure of our law by
constitutional amendment; that is to say, it is now primarily a political
instead of a legal question." 78
Throughout this discussion there is little to suggest that the
judicial yardstick, whether constitutional or statutory, is often so vague
and elastic as to leave considerable room for the operation of human
will and discretion. There is no hint that the judge, however hard he
tries, may not be able to remove himself completely from the wiles of
demagogues, the antics of pressure groups or the sting of an aroused
public opinion. There is no indication that the judge himself may
have emotional and intellectual preferences preventing him from operating as a legalistic automaton. Yet Benjamin Cardozo, himself a
judge, tells us: "The great tides and currents which engulf the rest
of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by." 71
And two years before Stone gave these lectures, Justice Holmes had
observed: "Behind the logical form [of judicial decision] lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and
yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding." 80 In contrast
with Stone, Justice Holmes suggested that the judges "recoguize their
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage." If they did
this, if they considered "more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified," Holmes
suggested that judges might "hesitate where now they are confident,
and see that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often
burning questions." 81
The primary burden of Stone's lectures had been to prove that
the "fantastic" theories, and "impractical aspirations" then parading
under the sleazy banner "social justice" were "political war cries," not
76. Id. at 48.

77. Id. at 153.
78. Id. at 154, 155.
79. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 168 (1928).
80. HOLIMES, CoLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS 181 (1920).

81. Id. at 184.
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valid "principles of judicial decision." Agitators had undermined
popular faith in legal justice and substituted for it "the notions of
social and political quacks." Such criticism was not only wrong but
vicious. There had been, Stone conceded, occasional miscarriages of
justice. But for these "failures" the "remedy, . . . like the fault, lies

. . . not primarily in our legal system, but with human nature itself." 82
The refrain running through the lectures had been: "Without public
faith and belief in justice according to law any system of law, however
skilfully devised, is but an empty form." 83
In 1915, within a few months after Stone lectured, another lawyer,
Louis D. Brandeis, also explored the causes of discontent. "In the
last half century," Brandeis noted, "our democracy has deepened.
Coincidentally there has been a shifting of our longing from legal to
social justice, and-it must be admitted-also a waning respect for law.
Is there any causal connection," the Bostonian inquired, "between the
shifting of our longing from legal justice to social justice and waning
respect for law? If so, was the result unavoidable?"
Brandeis, like Stone, suggested that there were "many different
causes" contributing to this unhappy plight, but he asked: "Has not
the recent dissatisfaction with our law as administered been due, in
large measure, to the fact that it had not kept pace with the rapid
development of our political, economic and social ideals? In other
words, is not the challenge of legal justice due to its failure to conform
to contemporary conceptions of social justice ?" 84
Brandeis had found the answer to his query in 1908 when he
demonstrated the relevance of factual knowledge, sociological data, to
constitutional interpretation. In presenting a brief to the United States
Supreme Court 8" he had introduced unconventional non-legalistic
"facts" to show how long hours are, as a matter of fact, dangerous to
women's health, safety and morals, that short hours are socially and
economically advantageous. In going beyond the lawyer's conventional
"facts" and legal precedents, he proved that legal justice could catch
up with social justice.
Brandeis won handsome praise from a bench of elderly, conventionally minded justices, indicating that judges need not be screened
from all knowledge of the living world. 6 The Court's favorable de82.

SToNE at 29.
83. Id. at 193.
84. Brandeis, The Lizing Law, 10 ILL. L. REv. 461, 463 (1916).
85. This brief presented in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) marked the
first appearance of that type of brief now known in the legal profession as "the
Brandeis brief."
86. For Justice Brewer's laudatory language see 208 U.S. 412, 419.

STONE ASSAYS SOCIAL JUSTICE

cision also indicated that the real barriers are rigid habits of judicial
thought, that what was needed was not an amendment of the Constitution but an amendment of "men's minds." "What we need," Brandeis
observed in 1916, "is not to displace the courts, but to make them
efficient instruments of justice; not to displace the lawyer but to fit
him for his official or judicial task." To qualify lawyers and judges
for "harmonizing law with life," Brandeis advocated broader education-"the study of economics and sociology and politics which embody the facts and present the problems of today." " In this way
judges, he thought, might free themselves of the public scorn Dean
Stone deplored.
But could Stone accept this avenue of escape? In the Hewitt
lectures he had observed: "The pressure of facts proven in court which
lead ultimately to the recognition that the established precedent does
not work well, either because it does not harmonize with other earlier
rules or because of change of conditions or because it does not square
with the settled moral sense of the community . . . has led to the
overruling of precedent." 88 In a subsequent lecture he took the view
that only the "facts" immediately related to the particular controversythe findings of fact by courts-are reliable. These are the facts "so
far as it is humanly possible to ascertain and know them," and they
appeared to Stone in sharp contrast with the "hasty or imperfect
generalizations such as too often characterize sociological investigations
where the data are not submitted to the scrutiny and searching tests
which characterize the trial of an action at law." 89 Whether he meant
by "stubborn facts proven in court" the kind of sociological data
Brandeis utilized, or stereotyped legal "facts," is not clear.
Stone, however, was explicit on the steps necessary to fit the
members of the bar for modern practice. "For the leadership of the
advocate and the legal scholar, the march of economic development
has tended," he said, "to substitute the leadership of the business
lawyer, who at his best is the skilful, resourceful solicitor, a specialist
in corporation law, and who, at his worst, is the mere hired man of
corporations." 10 Like Brandeis, he considered "present tendencies
. . . fraught with danger to our institutions unless they are effectively
checked." But his suggestions for a remedy had to do primarily with
"more exacting requirements for admission to the bar which conform
to sound educational standards, and the stimulation and preservation
87. Brandeis, supra note 84, at 468, 470.
88. STONE at 47.

89. Id. at 55.
90. Id. at 176.
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in every possible way of the professional spirit and corporate feeling
of the bar." 9' There is no mention of the Brandeis' corrective for the
"distorting effects" of modern specialized practice-lawyers and judges
equipped "with the necessary knowledge of economic and social
science." 92
At the end of the lectures, President Butler thanked Dean Stone
warmly for "having undertaken this task, as well as for the brilliancy
and success with which you have executed it." Butler passed along
the "chorus of praise" rising from judges, lawyers and others who
had heard one or more of the talks.9 3 That same year the lectures
were published in book form and thus reached a wider audience.
Both favorable and unfavorable comment was forthcoming from
the reviewers. One commentator agreed that Stone had achieved his
stated purpose-"to discuss before a lay audience some of the more
fundamental notions which underlie our legal system, and thus by
aiding a better understanding and possibly removing some popular
misconceptions of law and lawyers to contribute to the cause of good
citizenship." " "The author of the lectures before us," the reviewer
said, is neither an "unfair" critic nor an "unmeasured" eulogist of our
legal system. "The qualities of clear thinking, of thorough knowledge,
and of lucid expression, which have won him eminence as a lawyer
and teacher, enabled him to hold the attention of his Cooper Union
audiences, and make his exposition of the fundamental notions underlying our legal system simple, readable, and instructive. In no other
publication can the layman find a more interesting or satisfactory
interpretation of the genius of the common law." The chapter on
Law Reform was singled out as especially "worthy of careful study."
"It shows clearly," the reviewer commented, "that a true reformation
even of our procedural defects is not to be effected by legislative waving
of a magician's wand, but by the slow process of stimulating in the
public mind the love of justice, of educating it as to the nature of law
and the grave importance of delegating its administration only to those
who are fit to bear that responsibility" 9 5 -that is, to lawyers and
judges.96
91. Id. at 177.
92. Brandeis, supra note 84, at 470.
93. Letter, N. M. Butler to H. F. Stone, March 29, 1915.
94. STONE at v (foreword).
95. 102 THE NATION 314, 315 (1916).
96. Outlining the essential requirements of effective law reform, Stone had observed: "Law should be reformed by lawyers, for they have the knowledge, experience, and special training essential to the task of planning reforms and carrying them out, provided they are inspired with the sincere desire to correct the
faults and abuses of an existing system." STONE at 223.
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Other reviewers were less fulsome in praise. Morris R. Cohen,
describing Stone's volume as "decorous and unexciting," saw it as
an indictment of "those perverse infidels who would push the fallible
methods of modem science into law and religion," as dedicated to the
"pious aim" of strengthening "the traditional American faith that God
can govern his chosen people only through a constitution, courts and
lawyers." The Dean, Cohen noted, "has felt peculiarly called upon to
rebuke the adherents of sociologic judisprudence who would make judicial decisions in regard to large public questions depend upon the
fallible and sometimes hasty human sciences of sociology and economics . . . Why need the Supreme Court find out from lay experts the exact hygienic effects of working more than ten hours in a
bakery, when it can readily settle the matter by listening to two law-

yers?" 9a
"The author has succeeded admirably," Louis N. Robinson wrote
in the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review, "with a task that needed
doing, . . . to give the layman an idea of the legal system." But the
reviewer criticized Dean Stone as not "thoroughly acquainted with
present-day social philosophy." "He would improve the machinery of
law and make it more efficient," Robinson continued, but "he seems to
think that nothing else is really needed. . . . Now, admitting that
changes in the direction he indicates would be important steps toward
reform," the reviewer commented, "it must also be admitted that the
;non-expert' critic, whom the author has in mind as one to be silenced,
would still remain dissatisfied." The reviewer therefore placed Dean
Stone in "a group of men . . . who have caught the gospel of efficiency, but who have not seen the vision of efficiency aiding and actively promoting new ideals." "To be more efficient in doing the old
things," Robinson wrote disdainfully, "is . . . cold comfort to those
who have seen the inadequacy of doing some of these at all." 17
Robinson also queried Stone's treatment of the judicial process:
"His [the author's] attitude with respect to the position of a judge in
dealing with the constitutionality of measures is illustrative of his
inability to meet the just demands of the present age. He but restates
the arguments of the conservatives and makes no reference to the
'forward-looking' decisions which have been made in recent years, particularly with reference to labor legislation. . . . The layman knows
that these can be made and no legal quibbling will make him believe
96a. The New Republic, June 23, 1917. Unsigned review, generally credited to
Morris R. Cohen.

97. Robinson, Book Review, 65 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 708, 709 (1917).
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. The judges' "familiarity with life," of which

Stone spoke so confidently, this reviewer dismissed as naive. The
Dean had succeeded, Robinson agreed, in his major objective, but the
reviewer was doubtful whethler the author had done much, if anything,
"to remove misunderstanding and hostility." 9
In the Hewitt lectures Dean Stone had made a point of disabusing his audience of the ingrained popular belief that "every ill the
flesh is heir to could be cured by legislative fiat." 99 The next year he
had opportunity to give fuller exposition to his thought, when Truxton
Beale invited him to write an introduction to Herbert Spencer's chapter, "The Sins of the Legislators," in The Man versus the State."'
Beale contributed an introduction to Spencer's mid-19th century
bible of laissez-faire, and prefaced each chapter with an essay by
a well-known American, including, besides Dean Stone, Senators Elihu
Root and Henry Cabot Lodge, President Nicholas Murray Butler,
David Jayne Hill, Charles W. Eliot, Judge E. H. Gary and former
President William Howard Taft.
"It would be unfair," Beale commented somewhat self-consciously,
"to stigmatize" this group of "eminent living Americans" as "reactionaries." 101 But, obviously, the editor had chosen the commentators
with great care. "This series of essays will be republished," he wrote,
"to demonstrate the necessity of a return to conservatism.

.

.

.

They

will demonstrate that business enterprise as well as personal liberty is
in danger of being lost in the labyrinthine mazes of officialdom..
They will attack the apparently inexhaustible faith in law-made remedies and show that the belief in the sovereign power of political machinery is a gross delusion.

. . They will point out the childish

.

impatience of the American people with slow and natural remediesthe only sound ones-and will show that quick remedies are almost
always quack remedies..

,"

102

In his introductory essay Stone did not explore Spencer's favorite
topic of state intervention in the economic system except to query his
"extravagant conclusions." 103 "When Spencer applies the theory of
natural selection to the problem of what in our day is called 'social
legislation', he trenches," Stone observed, "upon what has now become debatable ground.

.

.

. The promotion of social efficiency

through natural selection, when applied to modem social life, is not in98. Ibid.
99. STONE at 217.
100. SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (Beale ed. 1916).

101. Id. at 1, 2.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 237.
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consistent in principle with the exercise of social prophylaxis through
legislation. The fact is that under modern social conditions benefits
are not always conferred upon either individuals or groups in accordance with merits, and the unfit do survive in fact and perpetuate their
species to become sources of weakness to the social structure." Nevertheless, Stone concluded that "Spencer's vigorous warning furnishes
food for thought and will perhaps inspire with caution the zealous advocates of such sweeping legislative changes as are involved in the
many proposals for the various types of pension law, and minimum
wage statutes, and modem legislation of similar character." 104
The pages in Spencer's chapter that received Stone's special approval were those inveighing against an assumption-more prevalent in
America than in England-that law-making, unlike the ordinary crafts,
requires no special knowledge or apprenticeship. For a simple handicraft such as shoe-making, Spencer had observed, a long apprenticeship is essential. "The sole thing which needs no apprenticeship is
making a nation's laws." The assumption was as monstrous for Stone
as it had been for Spencer.
"The complete interdependence of the social organization," Stone
declared, "requires that the regulative power of legislation be used
with caution and only after careful study of the phenomena of social
causation, and this in turn must lead to the study of all social phenomena
as biological developments having their origin and their analogies in
the individual human life. Their nature and development will be revealed in the comparative study of different societies. Their application
to the problems of legislation will be ascertained by the comparative
study of legislation. The legislator is morally blameless or morally
blameworthy, according as he has or has not acquainted himself with
these several classes of facts." 105 Spencer's indictment of sins of legislators, resulting from failure to prepare for the law-making task, required, in Stone's opinion, "no modification or restatement." Indeed,
he traced the "growing lack of that respect for law which must be at the
foundation of every adequate and efficient legal system" to the "Sins"
Spencer had excoriated.
Stone went on to consider another "sin" Spencer did not particularly emphasize-"disregard of form in legislative drafting." "The
drawing of a legislative act," he wrote, "requires exceptional training,
experience and skill.

.

. . No legislation can be enacted which does

not have its effect, and oftentimes a serious effect, upon the existing
law, written or unwritten, or both. He who thus undertakes to in104. Id. at 240, 241.
105. Id. at 239, 240.
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terfere with our complex legal system should not only know the exact
legal situation to be affected by the proposed legislation, both historically
and as a matter of existing law, but he must know how the desired
change can be accomplished by correct legal methods without the enactment of provisions which conflict with or do not harmonize with existing law intended to be preserved." o
By 1945 Stone was Chief Justice. He had rounded out two
decades on the Nation's highest court and had established a firm reputation as a "liberal". That year a correspondent,' happening upon
his introductory essay to the chapter in Spencer's 19th century classic,
was curious to know the circumstance leading to Stone's participation
in Beale's project to chart, via Herbert Spencer, a "return to conservatism." In reply Stone recalled that for some years after 1911
he had been a member of the New York City Bar Association's watchdog Committee on the Amendment of the Law. Until about 1917
this committee "conceived its principal function to consist in the opposition to objectionable measures and wrote few memoranda in approval of meritorious legislation." "08 Its recommendations, the Chief
Justice remembered, "were often the basis of amendments of proposed
legislation or a veto of legislation which had been adopted. Possibly
for that reason," he suggested, "Mr. Beale called on me and asked me
if I would write some comments on Spencer's chapter on 'The Sins
of the Legislators'." '
"Also, I should like to know," this 1945 correspondent asked,
"whether your views remain the same." "A vast change," the Chief
Justice replied evasively, "has taken place in the quality of legislation
since that day. Largely through the efforts of a group of us at Columbia University, Congress was induced to set up a drafting agency to
assist in the drafting of bills, which has resulted in a good deal of
improvement. This, of course, has nothing directly to do with the
'study of social and economic problems to which legislation is to be
applied. This varies greatly with the draftsmen of the bill as originally
proposed and the committee having the bill in charge."
In 1915, Stone had been more concerned with the mechanical defects of the law than failure of the courts to make legal justice coincide
with social justice. He agreed that the law was open to criticism, and
he was peculiarly sensitive to the necessity of "public faith in and belief
in justice according to law." He knew, too, that "general dissatisfac106. Id. at 241, 242.
107. Letter, William J. Newman to H. F. Stone, Jan. 3, 1945.
108. Report of the Committee on the Amendment of the Law, N.Y.B.A. Ya.
Bi.

131 (1917).

109. Letter, Stone to Newman, Jan. 11, 1945.
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tion with the administration of justice" was "not confined to the radical
section of the community." This, in fact, was conspicuous among the
factors driving him to search for remedies, for basic correctives that
would go deeper than the "sentimentalism" he associated with the
clamorous exponents of social justice.
The very mass of judicial decisions, increasing like the annual outpouring of new statutes, ruffled the calm faith of the legal profession
that all was well with the common law. Chancellor Kent in 1820 had
lamented "the multiplicity of law books", but his complaint seemed
frivolous to the twentieth century lawyer struggling to track legal doctrines through 100 times the 240 volumes on Kent's shelves. Despite
the valiant, though uncoordinated effort, of lawyers, teachers and judges
to "reconstruct parts of the law in the light of the whole and with
reference to those social functions which it is the business of law to
facilitate and control," the lush growth of precedent had turned the
formal garden of the common law into a veritable jungle. Uncertainty and confusion born of complexity, dragged out the process of
finding and applying the law. The inevitable delay became another
point of popular irritation-another reason for the declining respect.
Nor were the "ingenious devices" of private publishers a lasting
solution. "Every new citator, every new digest, every new compilation . . .

,"

Stone remarked, "comes, like Banquo's ghost, to

confront us with the disquieting reality that the common law system
of precedent which our forebearers have cherished for some ten centuries cannot continue indefinitely to develop solely through the medium
of reported decisions." 10 "To hope that such a mass of precedent
can be penetrated even with the aid of digests and glossators" is, he
declared emphatically, ".

. to indulge, Micawber-like, in the illusion

that something, we know not what, will turn up to remedy the growing
difficulties of our situation." I"
Stone was profoundly disturbed by this many-sided threat, and
gave way to a militancy he seldom exhibited. "No price is too large,"
he said in 1923, "for the preservation and perpetuation of a great system of law. .

,,

1"2

In 1915 he had looked nostalgically to the

past, wishing, as it were, that modern society could be reconstituted
to accommodate the "aristocracy" of the bar."' By 1921, however,
110. Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23 Co. L.
REv. 319, 320 (1923). The substance of this paper was delivered before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Feb. 8, 1923. Hereinafter cited as Law
Simplifications.

111. Ibid.
112. Id. at 333.
113. ST E, c. VII, especially at 159-165.
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he recognized that "we are now reaching a state in our social and
economic development" when impending changes "must inevitably
have a profound effect in future development of our law." He noted
"the tendency of society to become stratified into more or less distinct
and permanent social classes, the tendency for the social position of
the individual to become static, .
. the growing complexity of social,
industrial and commercial relationships, . .

changes entailing so-

cial, economic and political consequences, raising new problems requiring the application of study and scientific methods to their solution."
"Sooner or later," he observed, "these consequences must find expression in the field of law by the modification or adaptation of the
common law.

.

.

.

This will be brought about not only by judicial

decree but by scientific legislation, by the reorganization of Courts, by
the creation of more expeditious procedure, and one more nicely adjusted to the convenience and substantive rights of litigants." 114
Stone upbraided the bar for its failure to exert "the commanding influence" it should "rightly exercise in the development of our
legal institutions" and compared his profession unfavorably with the
constructive leadership conspicuous in medicine, science and engineering. "I have never been able," he had said of the common law in an
address to New Jersey lawyers in 1921, "to regard it as having reached
perfection or as a fixed and changeless system." "' By 1923 he went
further and listed "failure to appreciate the social and economic significance of facts or the relation of law itself to social well-being . ."
among the influences affecting
tion of law." 116

"

adversely the judicial declara-

These same far-reaching social forces had been operative in 1915,
but Stone then saw no need to overhaul and reconstruct the legal system. In 1921, however, he recognized that even democratic pressures
might properly have a subordinate influence on the course of justice.
"The difficulty in the past," he observed, "has been that the lawyer
has not felt under any social or business necessity of making his product
fit the wearer of it. In a society organized on aristocratic lines our
profession may for a very considerable time maintain itself without
minding whether the shoe pinches or not. But in a democracy such
as ours, the lawyer must not only know where the shoe pinches, he
must endeavor to make a shoe that fits." 1' Returning to the theme
114. Changing Order and the Responsibility of the Bar, address at annual meeting of the New Jersey State Bar Association, Feb. 26, 1921, published in N.J.B.A. YR.
BK. 1921-22, at 49, 52.
115. Id. at 55.
116. Law Simplification at 321.
117. Changing Order and the Responsibility of the Bar, supra note 114, at 65.
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of the Hewitt Lectures, he said: "Above all he must take an active
interest in informing the public how shoes are made and the very
real difficulties which attend the production of a suitable product." 'x8
Law could be stretched or shrunk to regulate new activities of
communities just as shoes can be modified to fit feet. An occasional
shrill complaint was no more evidence of a need for a different system
of law than a blister proved that men should wear wings instead of
shoes. The common law could be made to work in the twentieth
century if its doctrines were clarified, simplified and adjusted here
and there to relieve growing pains. In 1923, he told how the need
for reform had arisen:". . . the common law system carries within
itself elements which sooner or later will compel its reconstruction in
important particulars and its restatement with reference to considerations which cannot be sufficiently examined and correlated in the course
of litigations. . . . These elements are: the multiplication of its authoritative literature; the vague and shifting content of its terminology;
the uncertainty and confusion and lack of symmetry which is gradually
permeating our law through the accumulation of precedents which
are out of harmony with its system and its social objective." 119
Most leaders of the bar and the profession generally adhered steadfastly to Stone's faith in legal justice. All believed that the great
body of the common law remained as it had been throughout the centuries: ". . . the greatest exposition of the principles of justice and
right that the brain of man has devised." 120 For practitioners, jurists
and instructors 'alike, the primary difficulty facing the law was the
plethora of precedent produced regularly by the 48 state courts and
the federal judiciary. Elihu Root counseled his brethren that if something were not done, the law would be lost "in the wilderness of single
instances." 121 Lawyers could no longer hold to "the comfortable doctrine that law is the fruit of custom to be picked and eaten as we
find it." 122 "Such placid optimism," Cardozo remarked, "sanctified
abuses by viewing them as part of an inevitable order." 123 "Certain
118. Ibid.
119. Law Simplification at 337. Stone found a ready example of "the vitality
and persistence" of false doctrine in "the history of the common law view of the
invalidity of arbitration agreements." For his opinion of the utility of commercial
arbitration contracts, along with serious criticism of the methods of choosing arbitrators and proposals for integrating the arbitration device with law, see The Scope
and Limitation of Comnmnercial Arbitration, 10 PRoc. ACAD. POL Sc. 501-509 (192224).
120. Law Simplification, at 326.
121. Quoted in Hadley, Historical Background of Plan for Restatement of Law,

9 A. B. A. J.203, 206 (1923).
122. Cardozo, Book Review, 37 HARv. L. Rxv. 279, 281 (1923).
123. Ibid.
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at least it is," the same spokesman warned in 1921, "that we must
come to some official agency unless the agencies that are voluntary
give proof of their capacity and will to watch and warn and purgeunless the bar awakes to its opportunity and power." 124 "In substance our law is excellent, full of good sense and justice," said Henry
T. Terry, voicing the overwhelming sentiment of the bar. "But in
respect to its form it is chaotic. What it needs at present more than
anything else is a complete and systematic arrangement." 125
Unrest and dissatisfaction within the profession thus met and
combined with popular agitation for reform. Professional planning
for improvement, however, was directed mainly toward preserving
legal justice. Leaders of the bar wanted to create a private agency to
keep the relentless torrent of decisions within the channels cut for law
by the intellect of man-"by employing the skill and expert knowledge
of our profession," as Stone explained, "to begin the great task of
bringing to our law that simplicity and symmetry of form which will
enable it to endure, the source and guaranty of justice and right for
uncounted generations yet to come." 126
Increasingly, Stone's energies went into improvement of the law
from within. Between 1920 and 1922, he kept a file labelled "Anachronisms"-startling examples of legal rules out of joint with the
times-intending some day to write an article on the subject. He
gave much time and thought to how reform should be accomplished.
Codification was not the solution: "To place our law after centuries
of free development on a Procrustean bed of unyielding statutory law"
could only result in struggle of "the spirit of the common law to free
itself from its statutory bondage."
Codification, "exact and precise
statement of legal rules", would "fetter our judges and rob our law
of its really great contribution to legal science-its elasticity and adaptability to new situations." 121
Stone now gave more sympathetic consideration to "sociological
jurisprudence", defined as the effort "to establish in our legal thinking
that trinity of juridical theory-logic, history, and the 'method of
sociology'-as the source of all true legal doctrine." Though paraded
by its exponents as path-breaking, Stone no longer considered the
"methods of sociology" shocking or even new.
"It is not a novel idea, that in declaring law the judge must
envisage the social utility of the rule which he creates. In short,
124. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113, 124 (1921).

125. Terry, The Arrangement of the Law, 17 Cor- L. REv. 291 (1917).
126. Law Simplification at 337.
127. Id. at 330.
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he must know his facts out of which the legal rule is to be extracted and in a large sense they embrace the social and economic
data of his time. Many years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes in classic
phrase reminded us that 'the life of the law is not logic but experience.' If this is what is meant by the sociological method and
by sociological jurisprudence, it is the method which the wise and
competent judge has used from time immemorial in rendering the
dynamic decision which makes the law a living force. Holt, Hardwick, Mansfield, Marshall and Shaw employed it long before the
phrase sociological jurisprudence was thought of. But can we in
any proper sense speak of the application of this principle as a
'method'? Has sociological jurisprudence any methodology, any
formulae, or any principles which can be taught or expounded so
as to make it a guide either to the student of law or to the judge?
History and logic are guides but has sociological engineering been
reduced to a science and does it embody such formulae or principles as will enable the judge to render a just decision except
by the application of that practical wisdom which characterizes the
decision of the great judge and distinguishes him from those who
are not so great? If not, then sociological jurisprudence will not
tend to reduce the accumulation of anomalous doctrines; it may
even add to it. At most it warns the judge and the student of
law that logic and history cannot, and ought not, have full sway
when the dynamic judgment is to be rendered. It points out that
in the choice of the particular legal device determining the result,
social utility, the mores of the times, objectively determined may
properly turn the scale in favor of one and against the other;
and it should lead us as lawyers and students of law to place an
appropriate emphasis on the study of social data and on the effort
to understand the relation of law to them, because by that process
we may lay the foundation for a better understanding of what
social utility is and where in a given case the path of social utility
lies."
"Social engineering," he now agreed, was useful, but it offered
no royal road to reform. He still saw the "real problem" as involving
"adoption of some device" whereby the development of the common
law "may be more systematic and more scientific and whereby the law
may free itself of its centuries of accumulations of anomaly and of
rules and technique, the reason for which has disappeared or been
forgotten, without loss of its vitality and its adaptability to each particular case as it arises."'12 8 This was not a job for sociologists. Rather,
law school teachers must come forward with a solution free from the
29
difficulties inherent in codification and sociological jurisprudence.
128. Id. at 328.
129. Seavey, The Associatioi; of American Law Schools in Retrospect, 3
LEGAL EDUC. 153, 163-65 (1950).
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In 1915 the Association of American Law Schools had formed a
Committee on the Establishment of a Juristic Center, to which Stone
was named. War intervened, rendering the Committee virtually inactive until 1919. After two years of study the Committee concluded,
and persuaded the members of the Association to agree, that "an authoritative restatement of the law" would best accomplish the aim of
improving the law by "utilizing American legal scholarship for the purpose of carrying on constructive scientific work, primarily directed to
the clarification and simplication of the law and its better adaptation
to the needs of life." ' It was also the conviction of the Committee
on Juristic Center that "such a work could only be undertaken with
reasonable hope of success, by a permanent organization composed of
the leaders of the profession on the bench, at the bar and in the
schools." ' At the 1921 meeting of the Association, the Committee
was empowered "to invite the appointment of similar committees" by
other lawyers' organizations "for the purpose of creating a permanent
institution for the improvement of the law. .

,,132

The task to be done required a more formal approach, as well as
talent and expert knowledge under common leadership, enjoying
the active support and cooperation of the American bar. Beyond
all this, it was soon discovered that the project must have more
earthy support-money. For this the restatement committee turned,
Stone recalled in 1924, to Elihu Root, knowing that "he would
be eager." 138 Root, Seavey reports, "with his brilliant mind and
his connection with the Carnegie Foundation, saw the possibilities." 184 With the Foundation's support of a preliminary survey and
report 5 and upon Mr. Root's injunction: "Don't lose any time," a
select group from bench and bar were assembled in New York City,
May 10, 1922, "to consider the establishment of a permanent organization." The upshot was the Committee on the Establishment of a
Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law.'3 8 Among
130. Unpublished statement submitted by the Council of the American Law Institute to the Carnegie Corporation (1923). This statement contains a detailed account
of the work of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for
the Improvement of the Law, including a prospectus of the project to be carried
out by the American Law Institute.
131. Ibid.
132. Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Juristic Center of the Association of American Law Schools, New York City, May 10, 1922.
133. Unpublished address to the Connecticut State Bar Association at the annual
meeting of the Association at Bridgeport on Jan. 21, 1924.
134. Seavey, supra note 129, at 163.
135. Letter, William D. Lewis to Stone, April 1, 1922. See also Minutes of the
Committee, May 27, 1922.
136. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Committee, May 10, 1922.
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other eminent American lawyers, the Committee included William D.
Gutherie, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Roscoe Pound, John W. Davis,
Learned Hand, John H. Wigmore and Samuel Williston. An Executive Committee was named and directed to report on the method of
restating the law and the organization of the permanent institution.
Besides Stone, it comprised Elihu Root, Chairman, George W. Wickersham, and William Draper Lewis. During the rest of the spring and
summer, Stone spent a great amount of time on committee work, serving as a "critic", attending meetings and reviewing the work of* "reporters" engaged full time on the project.
On January 11, 1923, the Committee issued a call to leading lawyers, judges, teachers and representatives of professional groups for
a meeting in Washington, D. C., February 23, 1923. "They endeavored," Stone recounted, "to bring together the leading members and
the thoughtful minds of the profession the country over to lay their
program before them." 117 At the same time, the Committee issued its
report on the need for a permanent organization. "There is today,"
the report stated, "general dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice .

. not confined to that radical section of the community

which would overthrow the existing social, economic and political institutions." '1 Such dissatisfaction was "dangerous", the report
stressed, because "it breeds disrespect for law . . . the cornerstone

of revolution." '" "There are, however," the group continued, "just
causes for complaint. Rightly, we are proud of our legal system considered as a whole, but as lawyers we also know that parts of our
law are uncertain and unnecessarily complex, that there are rules of
law which are not working well in practice, and that much of our legal
procedure and court organization needs revision." 141 "In our opinion," the Committee commented, "the most important task that the
bar can undertake is to reduce the amount of uncertainty and complexity of the law." 141 Besides this aim, the report also recommended
promotion of "those changes which will tend better to adapt the laws
to the needs of life." 142

The law-teacher's plan, Warren Seavey tells us, "was to survey
the entire field of Anglo-American law, to discover basic principles,
137. Unpublished address, supra note 133.
138. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: REPORT

OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW 1

(1923). Quoted in unpublished statement of Herbert S. Hadley, The Advisability
of the Council of the Anerican, Institite of Law Undertaking as its First Work
A Restatement of the Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure, March 10, 1923.
139. REPORT, svpra note 138.
140. Ibid.
141. Id. at 7.

142. Id. at 14.
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and to state the rules which had been generally worked out in the different states." 143 Essentially, this scheme was a close cousin to the
kind of criticism Stone had advocated years earlier in his controversy
with Edward T. Devine. His own law review essays had furnished
brilliant examples of what could be accomplished. The plan received
a psychological fillip early in 1922, when the New York Court of Appeals 144 reversed itself and adopted the core of Stone's article "The
Mutuality Rule in New York." The prestige of the proposal was
also enhanced by Judge Cardozo's generous praise for the writings of
Stone and others, who had taken pot shots at the old rule. Cardozo's
application of Stone's contention-"that the only requirement of mutuality in specific performance is that the Court should have jurisdiction and power to compel complete performance of the contract on both
sides at the time of rendering its decree "145 was but one among many
examples of how scientific investigations carried on in university law
schools could and did inspire courts to reshape and reframe the law.
Special studies by experts also made for marked improvement, but
they were not enough, being "sporadic and unsystematic . . . with
each individual conducting his researches independently . . . often
without the benefit of criticism of others conducting like . . . investigations. .
," 14" This haphazard approach suffered also from inade-

quate coverage. "One field may," as Stone observed, "be intensively
tilled while another, equally important, may be neglected or only studied partially or superficially."
Stone at once swung his influence and support behind the plan he
had helped to draft. Just prior to the Washington meeting he told the
members of the Bar Association of the City of New York what the
restatement must accomplish: "It must state in detail and with precision accepted rules and doctrines, eliminating or modifying the rule
or doctrine not supported by reason or adapted to present-day social
institutions and needs .

.

. it must avoid the formal statement of the

law as a closed system, clearly leaving open for future statements, on
the basis of judicial decisions as they are rendered, the rules governing
the new and unforeseen situations with which the law must hereafter
deal as they arise. And finally there should accompany such a restatement, preferably in a separate document, a comprehensive annotation
showing the origin and history of each rule and doctrine dealt with
in the primary restatement, indicating conflicts of authority and, in
143.
144.
145.
146.

Seavey, supra note 129, at 164.
Epstein v. Gluckin, 223 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922).
Law Simplification at 323, 324.
Id. at 332.
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the case of conflict or in the case of precepts modified or eliminated,
the reason for the adoption of the rule actually incorporated into the
restatement."
"I suppose no one would deny," Stone observed, "that a statement
of law thus prepared would be the most important and useful law book
.147
published since the compilation of the Digest.
The goal-to remove "the obscurity and uncertainty of the law
itself when applied to new states of facts"-though ambitious, could be
attained. "There is undoubtedly," Stone remarked optimistically,
"sufficient legal talent and expert knowledge in the United States
and England to restate the whole body of common law and
,, 148
equity.
But the mere restatement of the law under private auspices would
not, he feared, carry sufficient authority to conquer the over-powering
weight of precedent. Therefore, some device must be found to reconcile
the novel contributions of cooperative legal scholarship, "which looks
beyond the particular case to the law as a whole," with the "principle
of stare decisis." 14' In a speech to the New York Bar, Stone renewed
a suggestion he had made to the Committee for a permanent organization,' 5- proposing that state legislatures be asked to approve the
restatement, not as a formal statute or code, but as "an aid and guide"
to the courts-to give the judiciary freedom to follow "the collective
scholarship and expert knowledge of our profession..

," 1

His

idea was incorporated into the Committee's report, but not endorsed
unqualifiedly.'
Out of the Washington meeting came the American Law Institute.
In opposition to Stone's recommendation, the Institute overwhelmingly
decided to issue the judicially-honored private law rules without seeking
legislative sanction. "If the work is so well done," the American Bar
Association Journal prophesied, "that it commends itself to the judgment of the profession sufficiently to be cited in briefs and arguments of
counsel and to be quoted with approval by the courts of last resort,
147. Id. at 334.
148. Id. at 332.
149. Id. at 334, 335, passim.
150. Letter, Stone to W. D. Lewis, Oct. 24, 1922. With legislative sanction,
Stone wrote Lewis, "the restatement would at once have an authority which a restatement not so sanctioned and approved would not possess and at the same time
would not fetter the courts as would a formal legislative code. It would give to the
courts greater freedom in adopting the rules laid down in the restatement and at
the same time would leave them free to deal with those cases when they inevitably
arise which are not covered by the restatement and which, on the other hand, has
not generally been deemed compatible with a formal legislative code."
151. Law Simplification at 336.
152. Hadley, supra note 138.
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it thereby will become a part of the law of the land. If the work is
poorly done so that it does not meet with the approval of the bar and
the bench, it will come to naught." "I Experience proved that Stone
had put his finger on the difficulty the Restatement would encounter.
"Not intended to be a substitute for the cases but only to clarify them,"
Thurman Arnold remarked in 1935, "it therefore becomes only an additional source of argument." 54
Nevertheless, formation of the American Law Institute was hailed
with high hopes. Deep interest and enthusiasm enveloped leaders of
the bar. The Washington meeting drew 355 busy men, including the
Chief Justice of the United States and presiding Judges of twenty-one
states. A large portion of the remainder were engaged in the active
practice of law, and with few exceptions, "every person present paid
his own expenses." ' A Carnegie grant of $1,075,000 assured a beginning "on a grand scale" with "every facility afforded for the
work." ' At the second meeting of the Institute in 1924, Cardozo
termed the ambitious project an expedition "To Rescue 'Our Lady
of the Common Law'." ' Stone himself appraised the movement as
"most notable in the history of the common law," 158 and accepted office
as a member of the Council, the Institute's governing body.
Enthusiasm born of the Restatement effort persisted. The labor
lavished upon it has been described as one of "three main areas of
public policy activity" which "in the first half of the twentieth century
. gave to the bar some sense of nation-wide corporate purpose." 159
Certainly Stone had been keenly aware of the bar's lack of professional
spirit and pride, and valued the Institute as a mark of "professional
class consciousness," and willingness to meet "public responsibilities."
But it is clear that for him this was only an important by-product, not
153. Editorial, The Restatement of the Law, 10 A.B.A.J. 176 (1924).
154. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS

OF GOVERNMENT

51 (1935).

Mr. Justice Branch of

Stone's native New Hampshire also saw the problem that had led to Stone's suggestion. "Probably," he said in 1936, "few courts will overrule their prior decisions
because they find that the Institute is against them." See Stone, The Common Law
in the United States in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 152 (1937).
Felix Cohen's judgment was more harsh. "The 'Restatement of the Law' by
the American Law Institute," he wrote, "is the last long-drawn-out gasp of a dying
tradition. The more intelligent of our younger law teachers and students are not
interested in 'restating the dogmas of legal theology.'" Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 Cot. L. REV. 809, 833 (1935).
155. Unpublished Statement by Council of A.L.I. to Carnegie Corporation, at
5, 6. See also AN ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. (1923).
156. Seavey, supra note 129, at 165.
157. To Rescite "Our Lady of the Common Law," 10 A.B.A.J. 347 (1924).
158. The Significance of a Restatement of the Law, 10 PRoc. ACAD. PoT. ScI.
309, 312 (1922-24).
159. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 276 (1950).
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the central task of the Institute. The job to which he conceived that
body dedicated and to which he devoted himself was that of enabling
"the common law to live on and do its appointed work as a vital and
energizing force in western civilization." 160
The period covered in this paper coincides roughly with Stone's
Columbia Law School Deanship. It was, as the preceding pages show,
a time of intellectual turmoil, of increasing awareness that, without considerable modification, the common-law system of Justice could not
survive. The system was imperiled from without as well as from
within. His problem was to find ways of enabling the law to cope
with the impact of industrialism without doing violence to the genius
of the common law, or to his intellectual and political inheritance.
The Restatement met these tests. "It would create a comprehensive
and flexible scheme whereby our law might move at once in the direction
of enlightened and considered reform with the best expert assistance.
. . . It would be free from those exigencies which in America seem
inevitably attached to efforts at reform carried on under the direction
of public officials and which are inimical to scientific investigation and
collaboration." 161 As his understanding of society took on depth and
breadth, he gradually reappraised his estimate of the extent to which
law could be revised from within to accommodate contemporary demands. "I should be surprised," Justice Stone wrote in 1938, "if
there were not a good many things in Law and its Administration with
which I do not agree today."

.61a

"Social justice," he had exclaimed somewhat intemperately in
1912, "is absolutely without value" as "a test for the correctness of
judicial decisions." 162 He then repulsed any suggestion that the sacred
vessel of the law should be reshaped to meet the demands of unprincipled howlers and muckrakers. The anguished cries of social reformers suggested "le bon juge" of Chateau-Thierry. 10 But incessant public clamor did have its effect. In 1915 Stone saw "social justice as the
basis of the so-called sociological jurisprudence," still dangerous, "foreign to the spirit of the common law, .

.

. destructive of its essential

qualities," nevertheless an idea to be reckoned with-"a theory of legislation." Stone then berated the new methodology as "an attempt to
formulate law on the basis of the legislator's view of what is sound
public policy based upon his obsirvations of social conditions." 164
160. Law Simplification at 337.
161. Id. at 336, 337.
161a. Letter, Stone to B. H. Levy, Oct. 1, 1938.
162. Letter to the Editor, 27 THE SURVEY 1983 (1912).
163. Radin, The Good Judge of Chateau-Thierry and His Anterican Counterpart, 10 CAL L. REv. 300 (1922).
164. SToNE at 42.
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By 1923 he saw that sociological jurisprudence need not be tied
inextricably with the political aspirations of captious "do-gooders."
Sociological jurisprudence had a contribution to make, in checking the
actual operation of legal rules, in measuring their effectiveness in controlling human behavior, in ascertaining the facts of "social utility."
What was formerly denounced as a "political war cry" now became
recognized and accepted as the familiar technique of the "wise and competent judge from time immemorial," capable of giving "a new inspiration and a new trend to legal development." 115 "But," he insisted, "we
must have other resources if we are to make of the common law the
great and abiding system which it may become." 116 For these he looked
primarily to the American Law Institute.
Throughout, Stone's fundamental concern had been to preserve the
genius of the common law, to restore popular faith in the justice this
system produced. In 1922, he believed that by clarifying and simplifying the common law the good in it could be saved. "The great
merit of the common law system," he commented, "is that the judges
have made their law as they went along, adapting it to the new cases
as they actually arise." 1" The Restatements, he hoped, would serve
as "a point of departure" for revitalizing the process. His approach
was thus more cautious and more painstaking than that of the standardbearers of "social justice." By conservative advance, under the guidance of experts, with due reverence for the past, the essential character
of law would be preserved, and public respect restored.
165. Law Simplification at 328.
166. Ibid.
167. Letter, Stone to W. D. Lewis, Oct. 24, 1922.

